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THE ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL FIRM IN THE EXPORTS OF
MANUFACTURES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Benjqmin I. Cohen

May 1973

Note:

__.,

Center Discus sion Papers are prelim inary materi als
circula ted to stimul ate discus sion and critic al
comment. Refere nces in public ations to Discus sion
Papers should be cleared with the author to protec t
the tentati ve charac ter of these papers .

The Role of the Multination al Firm in the Exports of
Manufacture s from Developing Countries*

I

Despite the failure of the rich countries to give substa."ltial general tariff
. l
preferences for the exports -of ma.iufacture s from less daveloped countries
(LDC's), their exports of manufacture s have grown rapidly during the last decade.
While the precise rate of growth depends on one's definitions of "manufactur es"
and of "less developed co,.u1tries," data based on GATT definitions indicate that
the value of manufacture d exports by LDC's grew by about 15 percent per year
duriµg the last decade, and by 1970 manufacture s accounted for about 20 percent
of total LDC export earnings and about 30 percent of export earnings excluding
fuels. 2
The LDC's have had previous spurts ~n their exports of specific commoditie s,
and a large literature exists on why th~ rapid expansion of their exports of

*This paper was originally prepared for the Notre Dame Conference on
"Emerging Internation al Trade-Patte rns of the United States." I have benefitted
from comments by the Conference participant s and by Carlos Diaz-Alejan dro a.~d
Jorge Katz. This papar is bassd en research supported by NSF Grant No. GS3374lx.
I am·solely :responsible for the contents of this paper.
½he preference scheme introduced by the Europefui Econo~ic Community in
1971 will not, under its present arrangereen ts, have much impact on LDC exports.
See Richz.:,:,d N. Cooper, "The Eu.::-opea."l Corr.munity 9 s System of Generalized Ta.riff
Preferences : A Critique," (Eco::-iomic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. l32j
November, 1971).
2Exports
of manufacture s (iron and steel, chemicals, engineering products,
road motor vehicles, textiles and clothing, and other manufacture s) by LDC's
rose from $3.5 billion in 1963 to $9.8 billion in 1970. Their exports of fuels
~ere $18 billion in 1970 ,· and their total exports were $55 billion in 1970.
Data from Internation al Trade 1970 (Geneva: GATT, 1971), p. 23 and .Internatio nal
Trade 1971 (Geneva: GATT, 1972), p. 15.
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prim ary prod ucts in the 19th cent ury did not
lead to sign ifica .~t econ omic de
veloR ment in thes e natio ns. The gene ral them
e of much of this liter atur e is
that , in Kind leber ger I s word s, "unt il the last
few year s, dire ct inve stme nt in
the less deve loped cou. ~trie s took on an encl
ave char acte r, in whic h fore ign fac
tors of prod uctio ~--m a.,ag emen t, capi tal, and
freq uent ly labo r--w ere comb ined
with limi ted host -cou ntry inpu ts such as a
mine ral depo sit, trop ical clim ate,
or in some coun tries , common labo r. nl
Vario us w~it srs stre ss diffe rent fact ors in
expl ainin g the· deve lopm ent of
these encl avas . Myint 2 deal s with the lack
of a dom estic tran spor t syste m and
cf a smoo·chly oper ating mark et mech anism ; Myrd
al says 3 "tha t the cour se of even ts
took this 'colo nial ' char acte r was not main ly due
eith er to ~he desig ns of thos e
who prov ided the capi tal and buil t the econ omic
encl aves , or to the inte ntio nal
poli cies of thei r gove rnme nts. It was muc.~
more the natu ral outco me of the un
h~;: eNd work ing of the co::rt enrpc rary mark et
forc es." Hymer and Resn ick, on the
ott~ r har.d I stre ss the deli! oera te poli cy
of the gove rnme nts of the colo nial
~r:wo r.i~. "a, Euro pe form ulate d
sing le stz,a tegic conc eptio n for the deve lopm
ent

a

l

.

Clrnr les P. Kind leber ger~ Al;;e rican Busi ness
P.bro ad (New Have n:
't'lt:O:: ! ty ?rc:1 s, 1969 ), p. l~S.

Yale tJ-ni

~

.
... Hla Myin t, "The 'Cla ssic al Theo ry' of Inte=
-nati onal Trad e and the Unde r
:!~·.* 1cpod Coun t:.--ie s," Econo:11ic Jour nal, 68
(Ju., e 1958 }, :.."ep rinted in Read i~gs
~:.:,.}l~~:-n.::itional Econ cmic s, eds. Cave s and John
sen (Homewood, Illin ois:
~,._;:--,.., r,.. n. I:-win, Inc. , 1958 ), pp.
318- 338.

J
r~:.:r.:.<lr Hyrd al, An Inte rnat iona l Econ omy,
Prob lems and Pros pect s (New York :
,:~."',;,·"r il.":d ilrot hers ,

1956 ), p. 100.

,
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of the world economy and planned a new division of lahor. 111

All these writers

agree that foreign firms played a significant role in the development of these
enclaves. 2
While we do not have comprehensive dat-a on the role of multinational firms 3
in the contemporary boom in LDC exports of manufactures, there are scattered bits
of evidence suggesting that these firms account for a large share of these LDC
exports.

Between 1965 and 1968 annual exports from developing countries by

foreign affiliates of U.S. manufacturing firms rose from $700 million to $1.4
billion. 4

Between 1957 and 1966 Latin America's annual exports of manufactures

rose from $709 million to $1,613 million, and subsidiaries of U.S. firms accounted
,,.-,
for 65 percent of this increase of $804 millio~.5) I estimate that in 1971 foreign

firms

6

accounted for at least 15 percent of South Korea's $875 million of exports

of manufactures, at least 20 percent of Taiwan's $1,428 million of exports of

l

Stephen Hymer and Stephen Resnick, "International Trade and Uneven Development," Trade, Balance of Payments, a1td Growth, ed. Jagdish Bhagwati et. al.
(North Holland Publishing Co., 1971), p. 483.
_2 As the cases of Argentina, Australia, and Canada indicate, an export boom
under the auspices of·Europeans can facilitate economic development when the
original native population is negligible.

·

3

Unless otherwise stated, in this paper I consider a multinational firm as
one that has production facilities in at least two countries.
4

Survey of Ct!:'rent Business (October 1970), p. 20.

5

The Effects of United States and Uther Foreign Investments in Latin America
(New York: The Council for Latin America, Inc., 1970), p. 29.
6

Unless otherwise sta·ced, in this paper I consider a foreign firm as a firm
not wholly owned by local citizens. Anecdotal evidence indicates that some
firms that are considered as local by LDC governments are in fact controlled. by
foreigners; this may be especially important in textiles because of the way LDC_
governments allocate their export quotas under the International Textile Agree
ment.

7
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ma nuf act ure s, and ove r 50 per cen
t of Sin gap ore 's $285 mil lio n of
exp ort s of
ma nuf act ure s. IBM is sai d to hav
e bee n the lar ges t sin gle exp ort
er of manu
fac tur es frcm bot h Arg ent ina and
Bra zil in 196 9. 1 In 1969 loc al.l
y-o wne d firm s
acc oun ted for onl y 42 per cen t of
$325 mil lio n of tra de in ma nuf act
ure s wit hin
. Americ
the La t in
• an Free ·Trade A
2
. t·i on.
sso cia
What are the con seq uen ces for the
LDC's of thi s rol e by the mu ltin
atio nal
firm ? Can an "en cla ve" dev elo p
when the LDC exp ort s ma nuf act ure
s? Con sid er,
for exa mp le, the cas e of the Me
xican ''bo rde r" ind ust rie s. Exp orts
of manufa c
tur es to the U.S. und er item 807 3
.00 ros e from $7 mil lio n in ,196
6 to $211 mil lio n
in 197 0. The Mexican val ue add ed
on the se exp ort s was abo ut one -th
ird , alm ost
ent ire ly wa ges ·at rat es above the
Mexican ave rag e. Mexican wo rke
rs in the se in
dus trie s spe nt 50-70 per cen t of
the ir wages on U.S . com mo diti es. 4
Is thi s a
con tem por ary example of the 19t h
cen tur y phenomenon dis cus sed ove
r 20 yea rs ago
by Sin ger , whe::_-e ·11 • • • the pro
duc tive fac ilit ies for exp ort from
und erd eve lop ed
• cou ntr ies , which were so lar gel
y a res ult of for eig n inv est me nt,
nev er became
a par t of the int ern al eco nom ic
str uct ure of tho se und erd eve lop ed
cou ntr ies
the ms elv es, exc ept in the pur ely
geo gra phi cal and phy sic al sen se 11 5
?

-

1-restimony of Joh n Tu thi ll,
(Jo int Economic Committee of the U.S . Pol icie s Towards Dev elo pin g Co unt ries
Con gre ss, May 197 0), p. 729 .
2
Jua ~ Car los Cas as, "La s Mul
Cemla Bo leti n Mensual 18 (Decembertin aci ona les .y el Comercio Lat ino am eric ano , "
197 2), PP! 605 -61 4. I owe thi s
to Car los Dia z-A leja ndr o.
ref ere nce
3 Item
807 .00 con cer ns the U.S
imp orts of item s fab ric ate d fra n . tar iff on the for eig n val ue add ed of U.S .
U.S. com pon ents .
4nat
a for 1966 U.S. imp orts
from Economic Fac tors Aff ect ing and for the imp ort component of Mexican wages
the Use of 807 .00 and 806 .30 (W
ash ing
Ta riff Commission, 197 0), pp. 66,
180 . I owe thi s ref ere nce to Ken ton : U.S.
Dat a for 1970 U.S. imp orts kin dly
neth Jam eso n.
sup plie d by U.S. Ta riff Commission
.
5
H.· W. Sin ger , "The Dis trib uti on
of Gai ns Between Inv est ing and Bor
row ing

...,

-5-

The next sectio n of this paper review s the variou s theori es about
why firms
inves t overse as in order to see what conseq uences can be deduce d
from these
theore ms. The follow ing sectio n presen ts some empir ical eviden ce
based on my
field wC!"k in Scuth Ko~ea, Taiwa n, and Singap ore and on other availa
ble empir i
cal resear ch.. The final sectio n is a brief conclu sion on the use
of incent ives.
by LDC's to attrac t multin ationa l manuf acturi ng firms.
As indica ted above , much of the expor ts from LDC' s by multin ationa
l firms
to other LDC' s. But a large share is sold. in the U.S. ·Impo rts
from all
LDC's wider tariff item 807.00 rose from $61 millio n in 1966 to
$530 millio n in
1970 (thoug h no~ all of these impor ts are from subsid iaries of U.S.
firms ). Thus
future U.S. trade patter ns are relate d to future LDC trade patter
ns.
It may be appro priate at this point to indica te why I pay little
attent ion
to the conseq uences of these trade· and invest ment flows on U.S.
worke rs, capi
talist s, consum ers) etc. Partia lly this omissi on reflec ts my own
compa rative
• adva.~tage and partia lly it reflec ts a judgm ent that those U.S.
citize ns injure d
by such trade and invest ment could be--th ough may not be--a ssiste
d by the U.S.
Government.

Count ries," American Economic Review, 40 (May 1950) , reprin ted in
Readin gs in
Intern ationa l Econo mics, eds. Richar d E. Caves and Harry G. Johnso
n
(Homewood;
Illino is: Richar d D. Irwin , 1968) , p. 308.
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II

Differen t theoret ical models lead to differe nt deductio ns about the conse
quences of foreign co:,po~a te investm ent •. MacDougall1 used a one-sec tor model in

which av~~y fim opa~~~e s in a co::apet itive environm ent and maximiz es profits
with perfect ca!'tai::.- ty.

With no change in tech..'1.ology

al'ld

no economi es of scale,

addition al foreign capital can then be shown to drive ·down the rate of profit
on the initial stcd< of capital , raise the wage rate, and increase domesti c
inco:ne.

As my colleagu e Richard Bracher pointed out, the results change as soon

as cne moves to a two-sec to~ model.

With linear homogeneous product ion function s

in each sector, a "small" country (facing constan t terms of trade) will find
that addition al fo:c•eign capital has no impact either en the distribu tion of in

come or on domesti c inco:r.e (since all the extra output accrues to the foreign ers).
In the formal theoret ical literatu re stemmin g from the Hecksch er-Ohlin
theory of interna tional t-~ade, foreign investm ent is seen as a substitu te for
foreign trade. 2 ' 3

It follows from this vision that the cppc-:M:unity to a·ttract

foreign capital, like the opportu nity to engage in fc~eign trade, co':.lld ma.~e
workers ~n the LDC better off by equalizi ng factor prices through out the world.
1
G. D. A. MacDo':.lgall, "The Benefit s and Costs of Private Investir. ent from
Abr-oad: A Tl1aore tical Approac h," Economic Record { Ma:..,.,ch 1960), reprin"te ci in
Readings in Interna tional Econcmi cs, ed. Richard E. Caves and Harry E. Johnson
(Homewood, Illinois : Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), pp. 172-194 .
2

sea, for exa.-r:ipJ..e, Robert Mt!ndell , "Intern ational Trade and Factor Mobilit 11
y,
Areerican Eco-:i.crr.ic Review, 47 (Jt:ne 1957)', reprinte d in Reading s in Internat io-:i.al
Econc.11ics, ed. Richa:,d E. Caves and Harry G. Johnson (Homewood, Illinoi s:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), pp. 101-114 .
·
3
ohlin ~ temperin g formal logic with empiric al obse:.."v ation, was more cautfou s.
Obse.." vir.g ttat ~r..ere wel:'e many factors at work; he concl\!d ed that "the tendenc y
toward a reductio n of trade may be counter acted by a tendenc y to increase d trade •••
"

i·

_,_
But ju st as one can sp
ec ify a se t of as su m
pt io ns th at le ad s to
"im m ise riz in g
gr ow th " vi a ex pa nd in g
fo re ig n tr ad e, so ca
n one se t up a model
where fo re ig n
in ve stm en t in th e pr es
en ce of do m es tic "d is
to rt io ns " ca n re du ce
la bo r's income
an d/ or do m es tic incom
e in th e LDC's. The
ra ng e of th eo re tic al
outcomes becomes
ev en br oa de r when on
e ad m its th e po ss ib
ili ty of th e fo re ig n
fi rm 's br in gi ng a
new te ch no lo gy as w el
l as ca pi ta l. 1
The fo rm al He ck sc he r-O
hl in th eo ry as su m es ,
.among ot he r th in gs ,
th at pr o
du ct io n fu nc tio ns ar
e th e same th ro ug ho ut
th e w or ld , th at ev er
y bu sin es sm an
maximizes pr of its in
a wo rld of pe rf ec t ca
np et iti on , an d th at
ev er yo ne ha s com
pl et e knowledge of th
e pr es en t an d th e fu
tu re . Th is se t of as
su m pt io ns ha s at
le as t two we ak ne ss es
: ( l} It le ad s one
to an al yz e th e im pa ct
of co rp or at e in - ':
ve stm en t in ter m s of
ca pi ta l flo ws ra th er
th an th e tr an sf er of
te ch no lo gy and
management sk ill s ev
en
th
re po rte ca pi ta l flo ws
. 2
-··- - ... ou·-··-gh
---· - -·- -.- ....... --- d____
ar e sm al
___ ..
l and (2} wh ile
.-,-,.
-·
....
it gi ve s an in si gh t
in to th e co ns eq ue nc es
of at tr ac tin g fo re ig
n in ve stm en t by
~e st ri ct in g im po rts , 3
it ha s di ff ic ul ty in
ex pl ai ni ng why U .S .,
Eu ro pe an , and
···-··

-·

_,

.,.

B er til Oh lin , In te rr eg
io

na l and In te rn at io na
va rd U ni ve rs i~ Pr
l Tr ad e, re v. ed . (C
es s, 19 67 ), p. 21 5.
ambridge:

Ha r
1Be
njamin I. Co
Fo re ig n In ve stm en t onhen, "An A lte rn at iv e Th eo re tic al Approach
Di sc us sio n Pa pe r No. th e Ho st Co un try ," (New Haven: Econom to th e Impact of
16 ~, November 19 72 }.
ic Growth Ce nt er
2
In 1~71 U.S. di re ct
in ve stm en t in m an uf
was $521 m ill io n, of
ac tu
wh
ich
53 pe%"cent re pr es en te rin g in al l de ve lo pi ng co un tr ie s)
al so borrow lo ca lly
d re ta in ed
m an uf ac tu rin g af fi liato fin an ce in ve stm en ts in LDC's. Fo r exea rn in gs ; U.S. fir m s
'r:. ri? ~i
m en t; ne t ca pi ta l ou te s in La tin America sp en t $669 m ill io am pl e, in 1970 U.S.
~vJ.,;,J...1
tfl
n
ow
on
s
pl
fro
an
m
t
an
th
d
e
eq
U.
ui pS. were $100 m ill io n;
were $200 m ill io n, an
and by de pr ec ia tio n d th e ba la nc e was fin an ce d by bo rro wi ng re ta in ed ea rn in gs
ou ts id e th e U.S.
1972} and Survey of al lo wa nc es . Da ta from Su rv ey of Cu rre
nt Bu sin es s (Novembe
Cu rre nt Bu sin es s (M
arch 19 72 ).
r
3
See Mundell, op . ci t.
, pp . 11 1- 11 4.

•

-8 J~ pa ne se fi rm s
in ve st in LD C' s
in or de r to pr od
uc e m an uf ac tu re
s fo r sa le in th
ri ch co un tr ie s.
e
Ho
w
ar
!
e th es e m ul ti na
ti on al fi rm s ab
le to pr od uc e at
:c os ts th an lo ca
lo w er
l LDC fi rm s? W
J
hy do n' t im po rt
er s in th e ri ch
co un tr ie s bu y di
l1y fr om LDC fi rm
re ct -·
s? The an sw eI ' ,
in my vi ew , ha s
tw o p ar ts .
Th e fi rs t comes
fr om th e H ym eI
"- K in dl eb er ge r an
al ys is of d ir ec
ve st m en t, w hi ch
t fo re ig n in 
st re ss es th at th
e fo re ig n compa
ny ha s some ad va
b et te r m an ag em
nt ag e- -s uc h as
en t, a b et te r pr
od uc ti on te ch no
lo gy , OI ' th e ow
ne rs hi p of a br an
name pr od ti ct -- w
d
hi ch al lo w s it
to co m pe te w it h
lo ca l fi rm s ev en
th ou gh it knows
le ss ab ou t th e
LDC economy an d
ha s it s he ad qu
ar te rs th ou sa nd s
of m il es away fr
th e pr od uc ti on
1
om
si te .
Th us on e se es f~
J .~ in ~ ~ ~ ~ aj :_
in te rm s of p ~
po ly I'athe.!'._thaI'.l,
ti a l m~'I!'.~-
._Q:f__p ~ rf ~ !J !P e~
J: t~ ~ n. What de
te rm in es th e si
m on op ol y pr of it
ze of th e fi rm
s when th e in it
's
ia l in ve st m en t
is m ad e? . W ill .
th e m ul .t in at io na
fi rm tr y to m ai
l
nt ai n it s m on op
ol y po si ti on by
, fo r ex am pl e,
th re at en in g po
LDC ri v al s w it h
te nt ia l
a pr ic e w ar ? K
in dl eb er ge r sa ys
th at 11 • • • in th e
po ly •. • game re pr
b il at er al mono
es en te d by di re
ct in ve st m en t in
th e le ss -d ev el op
ha s be en a st ea
ed co un tr y, th er
dy sh if t in th e
e.
ad va nt ag es fr om
th e si de of th e
company to th at
th e co un tr y. 112
. H is ex am pl es re
of
fe r, ho w ev er , to
m ul ti na ti on al fi
na tu ra l re so ur ce
rm s ex po rt in g
s fr om a LDC.
It is l.e ss cl ea
r th at a LDC go
ve rn m en t ca n ta
th e p ro fi ts .o f
x
a fo re ig n compa
ny pr od uc in g m
an uf ac tu re s fo r
ex po rt . As Fo rt
pu t it , "t he de
un e
ve lo pi ng co un tr
·Y
ie s ' co nt ri bu ti on
1(5 -..J .t,! >
•• • w il l be re se
v
rv es of lo w -c os
an d te ac ha bl e la
t
bo r. 113 Si nc e th
.......:-t-~;r--.
er e ar e now se ve
4
ra l LDC's w hi ch
a ca pa ci ty to su
ha ve de m on st ra te
pp ly th is ty pe
d
of la bo r, it is
d if fi cu lt fo r ju
st on e of th em
to

1

.

an ex po
B us in es s A br oa d si ti on of th is th eo ry , se e C ha
rl es P. K in dl eb
(New H av en : Y al
er ge r, A m er ic an
e U ni ve rs it y P re
ss , pa pe rb ac k,
2
l.9 69 ), pp . ll -3
~ . , p. 15 0.
3.
3
"T he Po or Co 1. m
tri es Tu rn fr om B
p. 91 .
uy -L es s to Se ll -M
or e, " Fo rt un e (
A pr il 19 70 ),
4
Su ch as So ut h K
or ea , Ta iw an , Si
ng ap or e, M ex ic o,
an d B ra zi l.
FO I'

__ . :.;..: ..
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t ax th e

II

.
f"irm. 1
monopo 1y 11 prof.i ts of t h e f oreign

The foreign firm will simply

move to ano1;her LDC or arrange its "transfer prices" so as to show little profits
in the LDC trying to tax the monopoly profits.

Thus the direct benefits of the

investment to the LDC are limited to the wages and local purchases by foreign
firms; there may also be "indirect" benefits, such as the diffusion throughout
the local economy of the foreign firm's technical and market knowledge, mana
gerial skills, or trained labor force.

The evidence on these points is discussed

in the next section of this paper.
The second part of the answer is that multinational firms may also invest in
developing countries in order to reduce the risks involved in supplying their
major markets from a single source.

A

multinational firm may geographically di

versify its production even if this diversification raises production costs above
that of LDC firms.

While such investments may reduce the multinational firm's

global risks, 2 it· may increase the LDC's risks as compared to having a local firm
exporting to the rich country.

The multinational firm is subject to pressures in

many more countries than is the local firm, and the LDC may be viewed as marginal

1This
statement is true only for those U.S. firms which do not immediately
·repatriate their LDC profits to the U.S. For those U.S. firms which do immediate
ly repatriate these profits, the method of calculating the credit against the U.S.
corporate tax for income taxes paid to LDC governments permits the U.S. firm to
minimize its total tax payments only if it pays some income tax to the LDC. See
the discussion in Robert Hellawell, "United States Income Taxation and Less De
veloped Countries: A Critical Appraisal," Columbia Law Review, 66 (December 1966),
esp. pp. 1395-1398 •

2
. For evidence on this point, see Benjamin I. Cohen, "Foreign Investment by
.U.S. Corporations as a Way of Reducing Risk," (Economic Growth Center Discussion
P_aper No. 151, September 1972).

C

.

'\
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to the multinati onal firm exporting to rich countries .

Stobaugh, for example,

reports that one U.S. electroni cs firm responded to the 1969-1970 decline in
U.S. radio sales by stopping productio n in its new Taiwan plant rather than
curtailin g productio n in its U.S. plant. l

We do not yet have any systemati c

compariso n of local and multinati onal firms' .response s to shifts in world
.demand.

1 Robert

D. Stobaugh, "How Investmen t Abroad Creates Jobs at Home," Harvard
Business Review, 50 (Septemb~ r-October 1972), pp~ 122-123.

,~-.>

A

,_,,,,ii

•·

-uIII

Since alter nativ e theor etica l model s lead to diffe rent
conse quenc es of
foreig n inves tment • I turn now to some prelim inary resul
ts of empi rical work I
have done in South Korea• Taiwan• and Singa pore. All
three of these count ries
have had a rapid expan sion of· their manu factur ed expor
ts I as shown below :

Expor ts of Manu factur es
1967

Annua l
Perce ntage Change

1971
(2)

(3)

214

875

11-2

39'1-

1,428

38

132

285

22

(l)
$ milli on

South Korea

Taiwan

1

Singa pore

2

1txcl uding ca"lne d pin_ea pple O canne d mushrooms and canne
d
9

bamboo shoot s.
2
Exclu ding ~ubb~ ~ a.~d p~tro laumo
Sourc es:

Mo~!h ly Econo mic Sta;i: istics (Bank of Korea ,
Februa...ry 1972)

11

Po 77 9 -Indu stry of Free China

(Dece mber 1972) 0 PPo 136-1 37;
Stati stics

Month ly Diges t of

(Singapoz-.s 0 Depar tment of Stati stics ,

May 1972) , pp., 11-1-42.
In all three coun tries foreig n firms were respo. ."lsibl e
for a signi fican t porti on

of these expor ts in 1971:

at least 15 perce nt in South KoreaD at least 20

perce nt in Taiwa n, and over 50 perce nt in Singa pore.,

Expo rts by fore.i gn firms

\ \ are proba bly growi ng more rapid ly than expor ts by.
local firms .

For some produ cts g

such as trans istor s in South Korea and telev ision sets
in Taiwa n 0 forei gn firms

i

I

\
I
\
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I

acco unt for over 80 perc ent of the valu e of
exp orts , whil e for othe r corrimodi~ies,
such as clot h, fore ign firm s appa rent ly acco
unt for a sma ll frac tion of exp orts .
My gene ral appr oach is to compare fore ign
firm s with loca l firm s making the,
same prod uct. The prod ucts cons ider ed are:
base ball glov es, clot h, feed stuf f,
wigs .

Thus my samp le excl udes petr oleu m and chem
icals beca use they are not ex
port ed by loca l firm s; all the othe r majo
r com mod ities expo rted from thes e coun 
trie s by fore ign firm s are incl uded . U.S.
firm s oper ate in all thre e cou ntrie s
and Japa nese firm s are in Sout h Korea and
Taiw an. The Sout h Kore an data are
base d on both fact ory tour s and on que stio
nna ires , and the resu lts are repo rted
in deta il else whe re. 1 The Sing apor e and Taiw
an data are base d on fact ory tour s
and on prel imin ary exam inati on of que stio nna
ires , and so my conc lusio ns abou t
thes e latt er two coun tries are very tent ativ
e. The allo cati on of the 75 firm s
by prod uct and nati ona lity is shown in Tabl
e l., wher e prod ucts are labe led to
pres erve con fide ntia lity of the firm s.
By comparing fore ign and loca l firm s prod ucin
g and expo rting the same com
mod ity, I assume that loca l firm s coul d expa
nd expo rts if ther e were no fore ign
firm s. It may be obje cted that the loca l
firm s coul d not expa ~d beca use of a
shor tage of cap ital. As argu ed in Sect ion
II, one shou ld look for the majo r
cont ribu tion of fore ign man ufac turin g firm
s in the area s of tech nolo gy and man
agem ent, not as a sour ce of cap ital. The
12 fore ign firm s in my Sout h Kore a.
samp le have an equi ty inve stme nt of only $12
mill ion and employ 8,60 0 pers ons.

✓

~enj amin I. Cohe n, "Com para tive Beh avio r
of Fore ign and Dom estic Exp ort
Firm s _in a Dev~ lopin g Econ omy ," Review of
Economics and Sta tist ics, 55 ( May 1973 ).
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Tab le 1
Number of Firms Inte rvie wed

Sou th Korea
Pro duc t

Loc al
(l)

A

G

H

I
J

I<

Tot al

l·
-·

.

.

.....

·•··

l

0

0

l

11

Loc al
(5)

For eig n
(6)

Loc al
(7)

For eig n
(8)

3

5

12

0

2

6

0

0

2

6

4

2

l

0

l.

3

6

l

2·

1

0

.1

4

3

2

2

l

l

3

7

6

0

l

·2

0

0

l

2

0

0

0

l

l

l

l

2

2

l

0

o·

3

3

0

0

0

l

l

l

l

0

l

2

0

0

l

2

l

l

2

0

0

2

3

12

16

23·

3

10

30

45

0

0

(4)

0

4

F

For eig n

7

2

E

(3}

Tot al

3

l

D

Loc al

Sin gap ore

2

0

C

·,·

(2)

2

B

·:P

For eign

Taiwan
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I do not have similar data for my Taiwan and Singapore sample.

Schreibe r re

ports, however, that five U.S. firms had a total equity investmen t in Taiwan of
$13 million, along with $7 million borrowed in the U.S. and $22 million borrowed
• Taiwan.
•
1
in

U.S. firms whose LDC fo:-eign subsidiar ies sold $276 million in manufactu res
to the U.S. in 1969 report investmen t in the subsidiar ies of $79 million and LDC
e,A::;,loy.nant of 66 t 000. 2

We also know that U.S. direct investmen t in manufact uring

in all of Asia (excludin g Japan) was on.J,.y $217 million during the 3-year period
of 1969-1971 ; of this er.aunt reinveste d earnings were $119 million.

A profitabl e

local fir,n would presumabl y have reinveste d also, and so the net contribut ion of
new capital by all U.S. manufact uring firms in these three years was $98 million. 3
This inflow of $98 million of new foreign capital via U.S. manufact uring corpora;:,,

....

tions may be compared with the $62 million raised by Asian countries (excludin g
Japa.,) in the internati onal bond market in_l969, 1970, and 1971. 4
These cou..~tries can probably raise capital cheaper via the internati onal
bond market.

The average issue yield on bonds issued by developin g countries

from 1969 through 1971 ranged from 6.5 percent to 8.9 percent •.5

While we_do not

. 1Jordan Schreibe r, U.S. Corporate Investmen t in Taiwan (Cambridg e, Mass.:
Universit y Press, 1970), p. 51.
2Econ~mic
Factors Affecting the Use of 807.00 and 806.30 (Washingt on:
Tariff Commission» 1970), pp. 152, 164.

U.S.

3The picture
is similar in Latin America. Direct investmen t in manufact uring
by U.S. firms was $1,102 million in 1969-197 1, of which $685 million was reinveste d
earnings. Data from Survey of Current Business (November 1972), pp. 29, 31 and·
Survey of Current Business (October 1971}, p. 35.
4
Latin American coi.mtries raised $469 million in the internati onal bond market
in 1969, 1970, and 1971, as compared to $417 million of new foreign capital via
U.S. manufactu ring corporati ons in the same three years. Annual Report of the
World Bank, 1972 (Washing ton, 1972), p. 93 •
5 .
Annual Report of the World Bank, 1972 (Washingt on L!972} _, __ p_!_.J3~ ------____
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have direct evidence on the rate of retum on investments by foreign manufacturing ·.
firms in particular LDC's, the U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that between \
1969 and l97l direct investment in manufacturing in all developing countries earned\\
1
14-15 percent on the U.S. parent firm's investment.
My tentative observations from the firms in my sampl~ are that:

(l) foreign

firms tend to export a somewhat higher fraction of their output than· local firms,
( 2) foreign firms tend to import more and to buy less ·from local firms than do
local firms making the same product,

2

( 3) local finns tend to have a higher value

added pe:r- dollar of sales than foreign firms , and ( 4) there is no clear pattern
as to whether foreign firms pay their workers more than local firms.
clusions are subject to two caveats.
exporte:r-s.

These con

The firms in my sample are all primarily

The comparison between local and foreign firms may be different when

they are selling mainly in local markets.

3

Most of the foreign firms are also

less than five years old, and their behayior may change over time.
What about the type of technology?

While foreign firms probably pay less

for capital than local firms, some people argue

4

that foreign firms may know more

abo.ut the worldwide stock of available techniques and be more concerned with
minimizing production costs than in acquiring prestige from a "modern," capital
intensive plant.

Strassman, in a study of 14 U.S. firms and 22 Mexican firms

¾:arnings are broadly defined and include branch earnings, dividends paid
by the foreign subsidiary to the parent, reinvested earnings by the subsidiary,
interest paid by the subsidiary to the parent, and royalties and fees paid by
the subsidiary to the parent. Survey of Current Business (November 1972), p. 23.
2
This second finding. is also true in Canada~ A Citizen's Guide to the Gray
Report (Toronto: The Canadian Forum, 1970), p. 59.
3

Katz, for example, finds that in the Argentina pharmaceutical industry
foreign firms pay higher wages. J. Katz, Importacion de Tecnologie, Aprendizaje
Locale Industrializacion dependiante (Buenos Aires: Institute DiTella, 1972).
4

Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott, Industry and Trade In Some

-1 6pro du cin g in Me xic o, co
nc lud ed th at U. S. fir ms
we re mo re lik ely tha n
Me xic an
fir ms to ad op t.l ab or -in
ten siv e tec hn iqu es . 1
Pa ck , in a stu dy of thr
ee ind us tri es
in Ke ny a, als o fou nd th at
the fo rei gn fir m wa s mo
re lik ely to us e a lab or
-in ten siv e · ·
2
tec hn iqu e.
~
.
W ell s, on the oth er ha
nd , us ing a sam ple of
50 pla nts in six ind us tr ies in Ind on esi a, fou nd
th at fo rei gn fir ms we re
mo re lik ely to us e a ca
pi tal int en siv e tec hn olo gy . 3
Ma son , in a stu dy of 14
U. S. fir ms and 14 lo ca
l fir ms in
nin e ind us tri es in Me xic
o and the Ph ili pp ine s,
fou nd th at U. S. fir ms
em plo yed
mo re bu ild ing pe r wo rke
r and ab ou t the s.ame am
o\lllt of eq uip me nt pe r wo
rke r as
com par ed to lo ca l fin ns 4
.
Le ff, in a stu dy of 20
fin ns in the Br az ili an
ca pi tal
go od s ind us try , fou nd th
at bo th fo rei gn an d do
me sti c fir ms re lie d he
av ily on
sec ond - h an d ma ch ine
. ry im
• po rte d f
h
•
rom t e ri ch cou n t rie
. s. S
In my wo rk I use el ec tri
ci ty co nsu mp tio n pe r wo
rke r to me asu re ca pi tal
-la bo r
ra tio s among fir ms pro du
cin g the sam e pr od uc t,
and I fin d no cle ar pa
tte rn . Sa ne 
tim es for eig n fir ms are
mo re ca pi tal -in ten siv e,
and som eti me s lo ca l fir
ms ar e.
De ve lop ing Co un tri es:
19 70 ), p. 57 .

1w.

New Yo rk:

A Co mp ara tiv e Stu dy (Lo
nd on :

ox for d Un ive rsi ty Pr es
s,

Pa ui Str ass ma n, Te ch no
log ica l Ch ang e an d Ec on
om ic De vel op me nt (It ha
Co rne ll Un ive rsi ty Pr es
ca ,
s, 19 68 ) ,. pp . 19 0-1 94 .

2
Howar~ Pa ck , "Em plo ym ent
in Ke nya n Ma nufact uri ng
de nc e," (m im eo, Ap ril 19
--S om e Mi cro eco no mi c Ev
72 ).
i
3
Th oug h he ex pla ins th is
re su lt in ter ms of fo rei
to hav e "m on op oly " pr of
gn fir ms be ing mo re lik
its be ca us e the y make con
ely
sum er pro du cts wi th an
tio na lly known bra nd nam
in ter na 
e. Lo uis T. W ell s, Jr
., "E con om ic Man an d En
Man: Ch oic e of Te ch no
gin ee rin g
log y in a Low Wage Co un
try ," (m im eo, No vem ber
19
72 ).
4
R. Ha l Ma son , "T he Tr an
sfe r of Te ch no log y thr ou
and the Fa cto r Pr op ort ion
gh Di rec t Fo rei gn Inv est
s
Pro
me nt
ble m in De ve lop ing Co
19 70 ), pp . 53 -63 .
un tri es ," (m im eo, Oc tob
er
5
Na tha nie l Le ff, Th e Br
az ili an Ca pit al Goods In
Ha rva rd Un ive rsi ty Pr es
du str y, 19 29 -19 64 (C am
s, 19 68 ), p. 27 .
bri dg e:·

a e,; -

f

[

f
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These various studies seem to me to be inconclusiv e, perhaps because some look
at firms selling only in the local market (Leff, Wells, and Pack), some look· at
fims concentrati ng on exports (Cohen), and some do not indicate the orientation
of the firms in the sample (Strassman and Mason).

Further empirical work is

needed in this area.
What about the "indirect" or "external" consequence s of direct foreign in
vestment?

Do foreign firms train local workers and/or managers who then move

to local firms?

Do foreign firms induce local suppliers to be more efficient?

Do foreign firms demonstrate to local competitors more efficient ways of opera
ting?

My general response to this set of questions is that the answer is more

likely to be affirmative when the foreign firm is the first . to produce and export
the commodity.
In both Korea and Taiwan labor turnover is low.

In Korea only two firms,

out of 18 answering the question, had had more than half of their assembly line
workers with previous factory experience, and both of these firms were foreign.
About half the firms reported that less than 10 percent of their. employees
(assembly line and supervisory ) had been previously employed.

Only one Korean

firm and one foreign firm reported that more than 10 percent of those previously
employed had worked for a foreign firm.

The one Korean firm was making transis

tors, which is the only product in my Korean sample which was initially produced
in Korea by a foreign firm.

Similarly in Taiwan, where television sets and tran

sistors were the only two products first produced by foreign firms, and local
producers of these two commodities have many managerial and technical personnel
who had previously worked for foreign firms.

For the other seven commodities in

my Taiwan sainple, which were first produced and exported by local ·firms, foreign
firms seem more likely to take workers away from local firms than to supply them

:,

· to local firms.

In my Singapo re sample, all product s were initiall y produce d by

foreign firms.
Most assembly line workers in my sample come from rural areas in Korea
and Taiwan. l A sample ,of 36 female workers , arbitra rily selected by me during
factory tours, revealed that 52 percent of those working in Seoul had fathers
who were farmers , and 85 percent of those working in other cities had fathers
·who were farmers.

In a sample of 36 female workers in Taiwan, 27 percent of

those working in Taipei had fathers who _were farmers , as compared to 64 percent
of those working in cities other than Taipei.

One can only specula te as to why

workers who have had no previou s factory experien ce and frequen tly no previou s
urban experien ce can achieve such high levels of product ivity.
In the cases of transis tors in Korea, Taiwan , and Singapo re and of tele

vision sets in Taiwan, foreign firms were the initial produce rs, and natives
who worked for these foreign firms are now employed as technic ians and managers
to local firms.

It is still too soon, however , to tell whether these local

firms will be able to expand and to export_ in competi tion with the foreign firms.
A foreign sewing machine firm set up a factory in Taiwan and induced local
supplie rs of components to improve their quality .

This improvement enabled

local sewin~ machine firms to greatly expand their exports .

This seems to be

the only case where existing local firms benefit ted from the arrival of a
foreign competi tor.
While the gross benefit s to the LDC may be greater when the multina tional
firm invests in a product that local firms are not yet produci ng, the costs to
the LDC of such investm ent may also be higher.

In the "bilate ral monopoly"

1
singapo re, a city-sta te of 2.1 million persons , has no signific ant rural
populat ion.
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barg aini ng betw een the LDC gove rnme nt cmd
the mul tina tion al firm , the LDC gove rn
ment pres uma bly knows leas t abou t the prod
ucts that have not been prod uced lo
call y, and henc e it is leas t able to eval uate
the pack age of knowledge and man
agement that a part icul ar mul tina tion al firm
offe rs. A LDC gove rnme nt can, for
exam ple, make a bett er choi ce among alte rnat
ive fore ign ·cott on text ile firm s
than among alte rnat ive fore ign colo r tele visi
on firm s. 1 Thus the net ben efits
(gro ss ben efits minus cost s) ~o the LDC may
be no high er for fore ign inve stme nt
in a new prod uct than for prod ucts alre ~dy
prod uced and expo rted by loca l firrn s. 2

1

Indi vidu als face the same prob lem. For mos
t purc hase s the cons ume r can
easi ly lear n ·about the rela tive qua lity of
simi lar prod ucts and compare the
qua lity with the pric e. For thos e prod ucts
a com peti tive priv ate mar ketp lace
give s an "eff icie nt" resu lt. As Arrow note
d, for some cons ume r purc hase s, such
as med ical care , the priv ate mar ketp
lace is less like ly to give an "eff icie nt"
resu lt beca use "the valu e of info rma tion
is freq uent ly not known in any mea ning 
ful sens e to the buye r; if, inde ed, he knew
enough to meas ure the valu e of in
form atio n, he would know the info rma tion itse
lf." Kenn eth J. kr'ro w, "Un cert aint y
and the Wel fare Economics of Med ical Care
," American Economic Review, 53_ (Decem
ber 1963 ), p. 946.
2
This type of anal ysis sugg ests that a LDC,
beca use it knows less abou t
the tech nolo gy than a rich coun try, will
pay a mul tina tion al firm more than
wil l a rich coun try. John son, usin g a diff
eren t fram ewo rk, reac hes the opp osit e
conc lusio n: that the LDC will pay less than
"pac kage " of knowledge and skil l. Harr y G. the rich coun try for a part icul ar
John son, "The Effi cien cy apd Wel fare
Imp lica tion s of the Mul tina tion al Firm s" The
Cha rles P. Kind lebe rger (Cam brid ge: M.I. T. Inte rnat iona l Cor pora tion , ed.
Pr~s s, 197 0), p. 41.

\
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IV

Looking at eith er the var iou s the ore
tica l mod els or the em piri cal evi den
ce,
I.fi nd it dif fic ult to make a gen
era l com pari son of the ben efit s to
the LDC of
the two alte rna tive s: (l) hav ing
dir ect for eig n inv estm ent for the
exp ort of
man ufa ctur es or (2) hav ing the LDC
gov ernm ent bor row the cap ital in
the int er
nat ion al bond mar ket and the loc al
firm s eit her buy the tech nol ogy or
dev elop it
loc ally . ·I sus pec t tha t the "na rrow
" eco nom ic fac tor s dis cus sed in the
pre vio us
sec tion exp lain onl y a sma ll par t
of a LDC gov ern men t's atti tud es tow
ard s dir ect
U.S . inv estm ent , and I hav e dis cus
sed else whe re some of the se oth er
con side ra
tion s for the cas e of Sou th Kor ea. 1
Sup pos e tha t for some set of rea son
s a LDC gov ernm ent dec ide s it wan
ts to
att rac t a number of for eig n firm s.
What pol icie s sho uld it ado pt? Sou
th Kor ea,
Tai wan , and Sin gap ore all off er for
eig n firm s five yea r exe mpt ion from
income
tax and exe mpt ion from imp ort dut
ies for raw ma teri als tha t ent er
int o exp orts . 2 ·
Bel iev ing (or assu min g?) tha t firm
s equ ate aft er- tax rat es of retu rn
arou nd the
·wo rld, economic the ori sts ten d to
arg ue tha t the lev el of cor por ate
income tax
in a par ticu lar cou ntry wil l aff ect
the infl ow of fore ign cap ital . 3
Eco nom ists
1

Benj amin I. Cohen, "Co mpa rati
Firm s in a Dev elop ing Economy," Revve Beh avio r of For eign and Dom esti c Exp ort
iew of Economics and Sta tist ics ,
55 (May
197 3), p. 196 .
2

These thre e gov ernm ents als o allo w
for eig n firm s to hav e 100 per cen t
the equ ity in the inv estm ent .
of
3
The oris ts som etim es not e tha t a dou
ble tax atio n agre eme nt or a tax cre
scheme by the par ent cou ntry 's gov
dit
ernm ent wil l make the geo gra phi c
allo cat ion of
inv estm ent ind epe nde nt of the LDC
's tax rat e (if the LDC tax rat e is
of the par ent cou ntry ). See for
exa mpl e, G.D.A. Mac Dou gall , op~ cit belo w that _
176 . As not ed ear lie r, thi s argu men
., pp. 175 t
firm imm edia tely rep atr iate s the pro imp lici tly assu mes tha t the mu ltin atio nal
fits it ear ns in the LD~.

J
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who have intervie wed business men about their investm ents in LDC's tend to be
very skeptie al that reducing the corpora te income tax attracts additio nal foreign
investm ent.

Hughes and Seng, based on a survey of 127 firms from six countrie s

that invested in Singapo re, say " ••• foreign investo rs, almost without exceptio n,
stated that taxation concess ions ••• did not play a signific ant role, and for the
most part played no role at all, in bringin g them to Singapo re. 111

Aharoni , based

on a survey of 38 U.S. firms that had ma~e over a hundred decision s about direct
foreign investm ent, conclude d " ••• that the granting of income .tax exemptio n by
.
. not an importa
.
f oreign
. f oreign
governm ents is
.
'
• • s. 112
nt f actor in
investm
ent d ecision

Schreib er, in a study of 22 U.S. compani es in Taiwan found, "while half of the
reportin g companies said that the tax concess ion was meaning ful, none said that
without it they would not have invested in Taiwan. " 3
Even if it were true that multtna tional firms respond to tax incentiv es in
LDC's, I suggest .that a LDC governm ent need not offer tax exemptio n to all fo
reign investo rs.

There is substan tial evidenc e 4 that most direct foreign invest

ment_is done by firms that are in oligopo listic industr ies.

lForei.
You Poh Seng

In such industr ies

Investm ent and Industr ialisati on in Singapo re, ed. Helen Hughes and
Canberr a: Austral ian Nationa l Univers ity Press, 1969), p. 183.

2Yair
Aharoni , The Foreign Investm ent Decision Process (Boston : Harvard
Univers ity Graduate School of Busines s Admini stration , 1966), p. 235.
3

Jordan Schreib er, U.S. Corpora te Investm ent in Taiwan (Cambri dge, Mass.:
Univers ity Press, 1970), p. 75.
4

See, for example , Raymond Vernon, Soverei gnty at Bay (New York:
Books, 1971), esp. Chs. land 3.

Basic
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•
it-i s quit e poss ible that most firm s will
imit ate the inve stme nt beha vior of
the firm whic h firs t inve sts abro ad. 1 As
Aha roni put it, "when seve ral com
pani es in the same indu stry went abro ad, othe
rs felt com pelle d to follo w suit
in orde r to main tain thei r rela tive size and
thei r rela tive rate of grow th •••
Imit atin g the commitments of a lead er on the
grou nds that . one is less vuln erab le
if his expo sure s are the same as thos e of
his prin cipa l ccm petit ors. " 2 Thos e

the U.S.

Supp ose tota l indu stry sale s are inde pend
ent of prod ucti on cost s (at
leas t with in the rang e cons ider ed in this
exam ple) . Each firm face s two kind s
of unce rtain ty: what will its riva l d,o and
how will cost s in the LDC compare
with thos e in the U.S. The latt er tmc erta
inty stem s from such fact ors as the
futu re of the exch ange rate for the doll ar,
futu re U.S. tari ff leve ls, and
futu re prod ucti vity leve ls and wages in the
LDC rela tive to thos e in the U.S.
Each firm is assumed to perc eive the same
"pay off" mat rix, as shown belo w:

1

rifte en year s ago Due senb erry argu ed that
in an olig opo listi c indu stry
"it is impo rtan t ••• for ever y firm to cut .cos
ts as fast as its riva ls do. But
that can be achi eved equa lly well whe ther
all the firm s follo w caut ious poli cy
and redu ce cost s slow ly, or adop t a dari ng
poli cy and redu ce cost s rapi dly ••.
the firm whic h is will ing to take the grea
test risk s will set the pace of in
vestm ent and rese arch expe ndit ures whic h in
the long run set the leve l of cost s."
James Due senb erry , Busi ness Cycl es and Econ
omic Growth (New York : McG raw- Hill
Book Co., 1958 ), pp. 130- 131.
2
Aha roni , op. cit. , pp. 65-q 6.
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Firm B's prof its
Inve st in LDC
LDC is
LDC is
low cost high cost
inve st
in LDC
Firm A's
prof its

LDC is
low cost

12, 12

LDC is
high cost

LDC is
do not
low cost
inve st {
in LDC
LDC is
lhigh cost

Do not inve st in LDC
LDC is
LDC is
low cost
high cost
20,

4

5, 5
4, 20

4, 20
10, 10

10, 10

Firm A's p~of its are shown to the left, and firm B's
prof its ·to the righ t. For
exam ple, if firm A inve sts in the LDC and finn B does
not and if costs in the
LDC turn out to be lowe r than costs in the U.S. , then
firm A's prof its are $20
and firm B has prof its of $4. If firm A inve sts in
the LDC and firm B does not
and if produ ction costs in the LDC turn out to be high
er than in the U.S. , then
firm A earns $4 and firm B earns $20.
_Suppose each firm follo ws a strat egy of maxi mizin g its
minimum prof it. If
firm B think firm A will inve st in the LDC, then
firm B will also inve st, since
inves ting i~pli es a prof it for firm B of at leas t $5,
as compared to a poss ible
profi t of only $4 if it does not inve st. If firm B
think s firm A will not in
vest in'th e LDC, then firm B will also not inve st in
the LDC. Ther efore , once
firm A inves ts, firm B will also inve st even thoug h
firm Bis stil l unce rtain
45 to whether prod uctio n costs will'
be 1owe r in the LDC than in the U.S. Simi 
lnrly , if firm B inve sts first in the LDC, firm A will
follo w suit.
It follow s fran this type of analy sis that the LDC gover
nmen ts need only ·
offer tax conce ssion s to the first forei gn inve stor
in the indu stry. Since in
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reality most industries have more than two firms, it might be necessary to offer
incentives to the first, say, three foreign firms.

Such a policy might even

accelerate the decision to invest in the LDC's, since each foreign firm would
strive to be one of the first three to invest.

This type of analysis could also

be extended to other "concession s" granted to foreign firms by a LDC government,
such as permission for the foreign firm to have 100· percent df the equity in the
LDC company.

However, as noted .i.n Section II, a single LDC cannot act al.one in

taxing foreign firms which are exporting manufactur es.

One can_ only speculate

on whether the LDC governments will be able to form a common policy towards
multination al manufacturi ng firms and thereby increase the benefits they receive
from investments by these firms.

